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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 8, 1979, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, introdiced S. 600, an antimerger bill that, if
passed, could well be the most radical piece of antitrust legislation enacted
in many years. Traditionally, our antitrust statutes have been concerned
primarily with protecting and promoting competition by eliminating spe-
cific anticompetitive restraints in the market. In contrast, S. 600 and other
similar anticonglomerate merger bills now pending in Congress2 are based
on the thesis that "bigness is badness," and that large corporations, by
their very size, endanger the social and political fabric of our country,
and therefore must be curbed. Thus, S. 600 exposes with rare clarity the
inherent ambivalence in antitrust policy between (1) the "populist" theme
that "bigness is bad, or at least highly suspect;" and (2) the economic effi-
ciency theme that a free competitive market, unhampered by Government
intervention, will best serve the consumer welfare.
It is likely that the merits of S. 600 will continue to be debated in the
months ahead. The purpose of this article is to explore the policy
implications of S. 600 and, in so doing, to demonstrate that S. 600 is an
unnecessary and potentially damaging piece of "regulatory" legislation
that should not be enacted.
II. WHAT WOULD S. 600 Do?
S. 600 was prompted by a recent wave of conglomerate merger
activity,3 which the antitrust enforcers believed themselves unable to deal
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1. See 125 CONG. REc. S2417 (daily ed. March 8, 1979). The bill is sponsored by Senators
Metzenbaum, McGovern, Nelson, Pressler, and Kennedy. In mid-December, the Antitrust Division
formulated its own conglomerate merger bill that, in most respects, was similar to S. 600. The
Administration has, as yet, taken no stand on S. 600.
2. See, e.g., S. 1246, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (prohibiting mergers by major petroleum
companies).
3. The proponents of S. 600 report that the number ofcorporate mergers and acquisitionswith a
purchase price of S100 million or more increased from 14 in 1975, and 41 in 1977, to 80 in 1978. 125
CONG. REc. S5713 (daily ed. May 10, 1979). They also report that most, though not all, of the mergers
within the past several years have been conglomerate rather than horizontal or vertical. See Mergers
and Economic Concentration: Hearings on S. 600 Before the Senate Conm. on the Judiciary, 96th
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with effectively by utilizing traditional section 7 tools. 4 If enacted, S. 600
would bring to a halt most acquisitions by and between the largest 500
corporations in this country.
First, section 2(a) of the bill establishes an outright ban against
mergers between corporations each of whose assets or sales exceed $2
billion. It has been estimated that this provision would apply to the largest
100 firms in the country.
5
Second, S. 600 provides an elaborate "regulatory" barrier to any
merger when both parties exceed $350 million in assets or sales, or when
one party exceeds the $350 million threshold and the other has at least a
twenty percent market share in a $100 million market. Proponents of the
bill estimate that this provision would encompass the 500 largest firms in
the country.6 A merger can pass the regulatory barrier if its proponents can
establish either that it "will have the preponderant effect of substantially
enhancing competition" or "will result in substantial efficiencies." It can
also pass muster under a "spin off" provision: the acquiring corporation
must spin off comparably valued assets as a going concern within a year,
before or after, the subject merger. The Attorney General, the FTC, and
private parties are all empowered to enforce these provisions through
injunctive relief. In addition, S. 600 makes clear that it is entirely in
addition to existing remedies including, most particularly, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act,7 which already bars any corporate merger the effect of which
"may be to substantially lessen competition" in any relevant market.
The supporters of S. 600 acknowledge that S. 600 is based, not on
traditional antitrust and economic considerations and procompetitive
goals, but rather on broad social and political values. S. 600, which is
appropriately entitled "The Small and Independent Business Protection
Act of 1979," is, by its terms, intended "to preserve the diversity and
independence of American business." 8 Thus, Senator Kennedy says that
[S. 600] reflects far more than a narrow or technical concern with the
interaction of forces within a given market structure. It represents a far
broader perspective-a social concern with the impact of corporate power
not only upon the character and responsiveness of individual economic
markets, but upon the very social and political fabric of a nation committed
to diversity and, individual freedom of choice. 9
Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1979) (statement of John H. Shenefield) [hereinafter cited as S. 600 Connlttee
Hearings]. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATISTICAL REPORT ON MERoRS AND
ACQUISITIONS (1979).
4. 125 Cong. Rec. S2417, S2418 (daily ed. March 8, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); S. 600
Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 61-62 (statement of John H. Shenefield). See also Id. at 16
(statement of Michael Pertschuk).
5. 125 CONG. REC. S3249 (daily ed. March 22, 1979).
6. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).




Similarly, Chairman Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) of the Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee says that S. 600 embodies "a new concern for the
small businessman in this country."'0 Freshman Sen. Pressler (R-S.D.),
who relates the bill to his state's "tradition of small farmers, independent
businessmen and an economy that is very much based on en-
trepreneurship," warns that "if we submit to purely economic con-
siderations unmitigated by social and constitutional concerns, we will be
guilty of allowing the evolution of structures which threaten our basic
values.""1
The antitrust enforcers support S. 600 in equally sweeping (and
vague) terms. "Our concern," says FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk "is
with the discretionary power of the largest firms."' 2 Assistant Attorney
General John Shenefield, as he then was, believes that "antitrust law as we
now know it has played an inconclusive role" in dealing with large mergers,
suggests rhetorically that S. 600 rests on self-evident Jeffersonian truths. In
Mr. Shenefield's words, "When our Founding Fathers said, 'We hold these
truths to be self-evident,' nobody said, 'What is your data? Where is it
graphed on the supply and demand curve? What can we prove by virtue of
computer readouts?' ,,13
S. 600 therefore embodies classic populism. Populism-a vague fear
of bigness, and a commitment to decentralized economic power and
decisionmaking-is, indeed, an important part of our political antitrust
history. The fears and outrages of small farmers and businessmen against
the "robber baron" abuses of the late nineteenth century had much to do
with the political pressure that made it possible for Congress to enact the
Sherman Act in 1890. President Wilson's support for the Clayton Act, and
Senator Kefauver's sponsorship of the Cellar-Kefauver Amendments of
1950, both had in them very strong doses of populism. 14 These populist
constituencies were a key ingredient to get Congress to do something-but
what Congress actually did in each case was largely consistent with notions
of economic efficiency.
When Congress has gone astray is when populist political concerns
have been used to create statutes for the purpose of protecting competitors
without regard to the costs imposed on consumers. Perhaps the Robinson-
Patman Act is the most striking example of this. At the depth of the
Depression, with small grocers and grocery wholesalers going under,
Congress sought to protect those people against the new forms of
competition being offered by supermarkets to more mobile consumers in
10. S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 8.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Id. at 15. Chairman Pertschuk expressed particular concern about the campaign spending of
political action committees and the extent to which large corporations have the ability to "mobilize
resources" and mount effective lobbying efforts to achieve their own ends. Id.
13. Id. at 97.
14. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-23 (1962).
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the emerging automobile age. The Robinson-Patman Act did not prevent
small grocers from going under, but it did remain on the books with bad
economic effects: it was an "antitrust" statute that tended to rigidify
oligopolistic pricing and make it more difficult for innovative buyers and
sellers to operate."
As with the Robinson-Patman Act, S. 600 is a-source of concern on
"antitrust" and "efficiency" grounds. Interestingly, the basis for this
concern is well stated by FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky:
[Most] conglomerate mergers are neutral from a competitive point of view,
and many are procompetitive in allowing the introduction of vigorous new
management or opportunities for efficiency through the coordination of
complimentary assets. Thus, much harm could be done to the competitive
process and the economy by a misguided, overenthusiastic, and insufficiently
discriminating conglomerate merger policy.
16
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, is also on point. As
the Supreme Court noted in Brown Shoe,17 a general populist concern
about aggregate concentration was an important part of the political
impetus that led to the 1950 amendments. Yet what Congress passed was a
statute based on economics which used relevant markets as the key
concept. The incipiency test Congress included-a merger is illegal if its
effect may be substantially to lessen competition-reflects a clear political
judgment, a judgment to provide a strong "tilt" against a merger in a close
case. What Congress did was to provide for a flexible inquiry, using market
concepts to determine the merger's impact on defined markets. In essence,
section 7 provides for a "rule of reason" inquiry that leaves the courts or the
Federal Trade Commission free to take into account a wide range of
economically relevant considerations.' 8
By contrast, S. 600 is aperse statute. It flatly bars all mergers between
companies with sales or assets exceeding $2 billion. It also sets up an
elaborate regulatory barrier for all mergers between companies with assets
or sales of over $350 million as well as those in which one firm has $350
15. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusTicE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 260 (1977). The final
chapter of that Report concludes:
The evidence reviewed in this Report . . . seriously undermine[s] historic claims that
the Robinson-Patman Act offers any sustaining economic protection to small business; and it
raises serious questions whether the Act advances the competitive goals of other antitrust
laws. Rather, the evidence is that the Act promotes high prices, restricted entry, and
inefficiency in the distribution of goods; and it has encouraged the creation of illegal pricing
exchanges by competing manufacturers. The fact that the Act does not apply at all to the
offering of services-a growing sector in which small business is especially significant-
reinforces the conclusion that the Robinson-Patman Act is not a key factor in preserving
efficient small businesses. Rather, such businesses survive, in any field, largely on their ability
to provide what the public wants: better service, greater convenience, and at times, lower
prices.
16. Pitofsky, New Perceptions at the Federal Trade Commission, 3 ALI-ABA CoUb.
MATERIALS J. No. 4, 6, 125-26 (1979) (emphasis added).
17. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-23 (1962).
18. Cf United States v. National Society of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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million in sales or assets and the other has a twenty percent share in a
significant market.
In antitrust we have not used per se rules, except in circumstances in
which the Supreme Court has found, based on actual experience, that a
practice was so generally lacking in redeeming benefits that it was desirable
on judicial efficiency grounds to avoid an elaborate inquiry in each case.' 9
In the one instance in which the Supreme Court clearly went too far in
imposing aper se rule in highly ambiguous and arbitrary circumstances,
20
the Court reversed itself a decade later and went back to a"rule of reason"
inquiry.2' The confusing and expensive Schwinn-GTE Sylvania history
stands as a stark warning against unwiseper se rules based on insufficient
evidence or experience of market impact.
In short, most Americans probably share what Chairman Pertschuk
labels the "Jeffersonian preference for dispersed power." 22 However, that
is not the big issue in the debate on S. 600. What is at issue is how high a
price we are willing to pay for such dispersal of power in the absence of any
clear showing of specific pending evils, either social or political, and in the
absence of any showing that such legislation is necessary to stem
anticompetitive mergers. This is especially so since S. 600 would, as is
discussed below, entail some real economic costs and prove quite diffi-
cult and costly to administer.
III. THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR S. 600 Is
NEBULOUS AND UNSUBSTANTIATED
S. 600 appears to be based primarily on the fear that conglomerate
mergers are leading to increased economic concentration among the
largest corporations in this country,23 and that this economic concentra-
tion will, in turn, allow large corporations to exert undue political pressure
to achieve their own ends. As has been pointed out by some observers, the
thesis that economic concentration in this country is actually increasing is
itself open to question.24 Even assuming, however, that the economy is
19. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1958). Among the practices which are
per se unlawful are: pricefixing, see, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); division of markets among competitors, see, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211 (1899); group boycotts, see, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941); and tying arrangements, see, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947).
20. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
21. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
22. S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 14.
23. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra. This increasing concentration is most often
documented by statistics showing an increase in the percent of manufacturing assets held by the top 200
manufacturing firms. See, e.g., S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 80 (statement of John
H. Shenefield). According to the testimony presented to the Committee, the percent ofmanufacturing
assets held by the top 200 manufacturing firms show an increase in concentration from 46% in 1947
to 57% in 1963, to 61% in 1972. Id. The testimony also shows, however, that only about 13% of this
growth in assets of the top 200 firms was attributable to mergers and acquisitions. Id. at 63.
24. A number of observers have found the concentration statistics based on the assets ofthe top
200 manufacturing companies (which are most often used to support claims of increasing concentra-
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more concentrated than it was a decade ago, and that conglomerate
mergers have contributed to that increased concentration, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that large corporations are able to exert
undue political power to achieve their own ends. To the contrary, the
most effective lobbyists for protective "regulatory" schemes tend to be
smaller businesses, which are spread across the country in most
Congressional districts and which are well organized to take their case to
Congress and the state legislatures. While Congress tends to turn a gen-
erally deaf ear to auto makers and oil companies on such issues, small lo-
cal dealers have little difficulty in securing a growing wave of automobile
dealer and gasoline dealer protection legislation.25 In short, it is the local
dealers, through their effective organizations, that are winning the legis-
lative battles, not General Motors or Exxon. 6 Furthermore, the legislative
measures that are now being pushed under the "bigness is badness" flag
are plainly anticonsumer-a point eloquently made by John Shenefield in
his testimony opposing the gasoline dealers' protection legislation in
Virginia.27
The alleged social evils the proponents of S. 600 seek to address in
S. 600 are also ill-defined and are based entirely on limited anecdotal evi-
dence. In addition to the general "populist" fears which appear to be the
central concern of S. 600,28 the proponents of S. 600 also contend that
conglomerate mergers lead to plant closings and the replacement of local
managerial personnel by personnel selected by the absentee conglomerate
and that such activities may impact adversely on the social welfare of the
communities in which the acquired firms are located.
tion) to be misleading, and note that other measures indicate there has been little, if any, increase in
concentration over the last thirty or forty years. See, e.g., Ehrbar, 'Bigness' Becomes the Target of the
Trustbusters, FORTUNE, March 26, 1979, at 37; S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (remarks
of Sen. Thurmond indicating that the number of corporations in various size ranges has increased
dramatically in recent years and that the increase in the assets of the top 200 firms is due largely to an
increase in the assets of firms in the petroleum and petrochemical industries which have been investing
heavily in response to the energy crisis).
25. Ohio has recentlyjoined this list with the enactment of S. 206 on December 12, 1979, which
amended chapter 4517 (and related provisions) of the Revised Code to give special protection to auto-
mobile dealers.
26. One qualification to this general point is appropriate: when a vety large enterprise is fnced
with business failure-generally resulting from its inability to be a strong fictor in the market-then
the enterprise, working closely with its labor unions, bankers, and civic groups is sometimes able to
get some form of"bail out" legislation from the government. Lockheed did a few years ago and Chry-
sler seems to be doing so now. While such "bail out" legislation may be of questionable economic
wisdom, it does not reveal any general political power of large corporations that requires the broad
cures of S. 600.
27. In his testimony, then-Assistant Attorney General Shenefield stated.
In considering the merits of divorcement legislation, it is important to bear in mind that
consumer interests are not necessarily identical to the interests of individual competitors;
indeed, consumer interests are relatively fragile and can be easily sacrificed ifthe competitive
process is distorted or stifled. . . . Indeed, the very breadth of this legislation suggests that
its effect would be to restrict rather than promote competition.
Retail Marketing Divorcement and Divestiture Legislation: Hearings Before the General Laws
Committee of the Virginia House of Delegates 2, 15 (Richmond, Va. 1979).
28. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra.
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Both purported "evils" are based on a virtually non-existent data
base. As to the first problem-local plant closings-the proponents of S.
600 point to a few isolated instances in which a plant in a given location was
closed down following a merger.29 Plant closings, however, are a normal,
healthy part of the competitive process, and, as noted in the hearings on S.
600, none of the proponents of that legislation have offered any empirical
data to demonstrate that such plant closings occur with disproportionate
frequency as a result of conglomerate mergers.30 Similarly, the replace-
ment of management personnel from outside the local community does
not necessarily represent a social problem, for, as is developed more fully
below, 31 the entrenchment of less competent incumbent managements is
hardly a laudable social or economic goal. Furthermore, the proponents of
S. 600 have been unable to point to any generalized, empirical data
indicating either the dimensions of the perceived problem, the extent to
which the problem is associated with conglomerate mergers in particular,
or the extent to which the replacement of local management personnel by
outside personnel selected by the conglomerate actually impacts adversely
on the community or its overall social fabric.
32
In short, as noted at the hearings on S. 600, there is almost a total lack
of empirical data on the extent to which the asserted social or political
problems associated with conglomerate mergers are indeed real. The evi-
dence before the Committee has consisted only of isolated anecdotes
from individuals who consider specific mergers to have been either"good"
or "bad" for the communities in which they are located.33 Such a meager
and subjective data base simply does not provide a sufficient rationale
for enacting S. 600 with its far-reaching implications and consequences.
This is especially so since, as is developed below, the existing antitrust
laws are adequate to prevent anticompetitive mergers. Furthermore,
S. 600, if enacted, will likely entail significant economic risks and
prove quite burdensome and costly to administer.
IV. EXISTING LEGISLATION IS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT
AGAINST ANTICOMPETITIVE MERGERS
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the primary antitrust tool that has been
used to attack mergers, proscribes those mergers "where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
29. See 125 CONG. REc. S2419 (daily ed. March 8,1979); S. 600 Committee Hearings,supra note
3, at 4 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy citing closings at Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Colonial Press).
30. Mergers and Economic Concentration: Hearings on S. 600 Before the Subcomm. on Ant-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm. 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (Pt. 21979) (statement of
William Baxter) [hereinafter S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings], S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note
3, at 10 (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
31. See notes 52, 53 and abcompanying text infra.
32. See S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 30, at 50-52 (statement of Ira Millstein).
33. Id. at 51.
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be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly. 3 4
Section 7, because it incorporates an "incipiency" rather than an actual
effect standard, is a strong yet flexible tool for combating anticompetitive
mergers.
Most antitrust learning in the merger field has arisen with regard to
"horizontal" mergers, which involve direct competitors in the same
market, and "vertical" mergers, which involve acquisitions of customers or
suppliers. The legal rules applied to these types of me:rgers are so strict that
relatively few horizontal or vertical mergers are now attempted. These
strict rules are, of course, also applicable to conglomerate mergers that
produce significant horizontal or vertical effects. For example, when a
company wishes to make a second significant acquisition in the same field,
the transaction probably would be treated as a "horizontal" merger and it
would quite probably be challenged by the Justice Department under the
rules set forth in Philadelphia National Bank35 and its progeny,
36
Similarly, when the conglomerate company is attempting to acquire a
supplier or a customer of one of its existing divisions or subsidiaries, the
rules set forth in Brown Shoe,37 Ford Motor Co.,38 and other vertical
merger cases might well be applied.
Some conglomerate mergers, however, include neither horizontal nor
vertical effects.39 It has been more difficult to frame simple market share
rules to deal with this category of merger transactions since the particular
effects on competition (if any) entailed by such mergers vary considerably
depending on the particular facts of the merger. Nevertheless, viable
theories have been developed in this area as well as in the horizontal and
vertical merger area.
There are at least three theories that have proved viable in attacking
conglomerate mergers. Moreover, there is one additional theory-the pure
"deep pocket" theory-that seems to offer additional potential for
attacking conglomerate mergers but which, as yet, is largely untried.
The most-used theory is that of "potential competition." This theory
can be utilized when one of the leading members of a concentrated market
proposes merging with one of a small group of likely potential entrants
34. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
35. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
36. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350(1970); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966);
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441(1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
377 U.S. 271 (1964). See also Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, [1977] TRADE REa. REi,
(CCH) 4510.
37. Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
38. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). See also Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines, supra note 36.
39. Although the concerns underlying S. 600 are plurportedly directed to "pure" conglomerate
mergers (Le., those mergers which do not involve either horizontal or vertical effects), S, 600, as
currently drafted, would also apply to pure horizontal and vertical mcrgers. Thus, it is possible that
even those mergers that could survive the strict tests applied to such mergers under § 7 would none-
theless be "caught" by S. 600.
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into that market. Potential competition may be "perceived" or "actual."
Perceived potential competition describes an existing competitive effect
resulting from the perception by firms in an oligopolistic market of the
threat of entry by a potential competitor on the fringe of the market,
regardless of whether the potential entrant has an actual intent of
entering.40 The Burger Court endorsed and applied this theory in United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,4' in which it held that section 7 may bar a
merger by a firm that, although not in the market, presently exerts a
beneficial influence on competitive conditions in the market by virtue of
being perceived as a potential entrant by companies operating in that
market. Under this theory, there need be no showing that the company
actually would have entered the market de novo or through a toehold
acquisition.
Actual potential competition ("future entry") describes a future
competitive effect without any reference to whether existing competitors
perceive its possibility: probable new entry by one of the merging
companies will deconcentrate an oligopolistic market in which the other is
a significant factor. In other words, under the actual potential competition
theory, a conglomerate merger into a concentrated market may violate
section 7 even if it has no present anticompetitive effect on the market
because it precludes the acquiring company's entrance into the market de
novo or through a toehold acquisition. While not without evidentiary
pitfalls, 42 both of the potential competition theories remain viable
doctrines for attacking conglomerate mergers.
40. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964); see generally,
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, supra note 36.
41. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
42. See S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 65-66 (statement of John H. Shene-
field). The Supreme Court's position on the actual potential competition theory is somewhat uncer-
tain. The Court declined to endorse the doctrine in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,418
U.S. 602,632-39 (1974); and in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,537 (1973). In
addition, the Court in Marine Bancorporation indicated that there were two preconditions to
application of the theory. (1) the entering firm must have an"available feasible means" for entering the
market other than by the challenged merger or acquisition; and (2) the alternative method of market
entry must "offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or
other significant procompetitive effects." Id. at 633. Both preconditions obviously impose a relatively
heavy burden of proof on the government. See, e.g., Black & Decker Mfg. Co., [1976-2]Trade Cas.
61,033 (D. Md. August 20, 1975); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289,296-97 (4th Cir. 1977).
Subjective evidence of future entry, however, is not required to make out a § 7 case. United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 532, 563-70 (Marshall, J., concurring in result).
Most recently, the Burger Court has avoided ruling on some far-reaching potential competition
holdings of lower courts against particular mergers and has therefore left the status of the actual
potential competition doctrine and associated evidentiary questions in doubt. The Court denied review
in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC,467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,416 U.S. 909 (1974), and,
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States, 418 U.S. 906 (1974), the Court summarily affirmed the
district court decision holding a market extension acquisition invalid both because it removed "the
likelihood that [the acquiring firm] would enter the market unilaterally in the future" and because it
eliminated "the procompetitive influence [the acquiring firm] exerted from its presence on the edge of
the market." 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 1973). Because Phillips Petroleum was grounded on
both the potential and actual competition theories, the Supreme Court's affirmance does not
necessarily indicate the Court's acceptance of the "alternate entry" theory.
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A second theory-that of "reciprocity"-can be applied to block a
merger when it can be shown that one of the merging firms makes
significant purchases from companies that are, in turn, significant
purchasers of goods in a market in which the other merging firm sells.43
While the reciprocity theory is perhaps of more limited applicability than
the potential competition doctrine, it too remains a viable economic theory
for attacking conglomerate mergers.44
A third theory utilized to. attack conglomerate mergers is "entrench-
ment." This theory has been successfully used to attack acquisitions in
which a large outside firm acquires a leading firm in a relatively
concentrated or rapidly concentrating market.45 The argument made is
that the economic power of the acquiring firm could be utilized to shore up
the acquired firm and entrench the market share of the acquired company.
A final theory that may be used to attack conglomerate mergers is
what may be termed a pure "deep pocket" theory. This theory has
significant potential for attacking conglomerate mergers while at the same
time maintaining the traditional focus of the antitrust laws-to evaluate
potentially harmful competitive effects in specific markets.
The extent to which the courts will be willing to apply this theory to
conglomerate mergers is as yet unknown.46 The Antitrust Division used
the "deep pocket" theory in large merger cases that were filed to bar
contested takeovers. The Antitrust Division lost the first of these cases,
United States v. United Technologies Corp.47 In the second case, United
States v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,48 Occidental Petroleum attempted
to acquire the Mead Corporation. In that case the government was able to
put together a broad range of testimony by economic experts and
competitors in the industry concerning the prospective impact of
Occidental's "deep pocket" on competition in the relatively concentrated
paper industry. The case was never decided because Occidental, under
pressure from the Justice Department and Mead, as well as from the SEC
and the Ohio State Securities Commission, withdrew from the merger.
Thus, it is not known how the court would have ruled on the government's
"deep pocket" theory. However, it appeared at the time that the
government, with a reasonable evidentiary case, a good trial effort, and
43. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
44. See R. Donnem, Reciprocity and Reciprocity Effects, address to the Antitrust Law Section
of the American Bar Association, August 12, 1969, reprinted in [1972] TRADE REa, REP. (CCH)
50,110 (summarizing case precedent and concluding that "reciprocity effect" theory constitutes a
formidable basis for establishing antitrust violations); Allis Chambers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol,
Indus., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United States v. White Consol.
Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
45. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Ekco Prods, Co. v. FTC, 347
F. 2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
46. See Baker, Conglomerate Campaign Registers One Loss, One Draw in 1978, Nat'l L. J.,
January 15, 1979, at 22.
47. (1978-2] Trade Cas. 62,393 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1978).
48. Civ. Nos. C-3-78-241/242/268/288 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
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close cooperation with one of the merger parties, had a good chance of
scoring a broad conglomerate merger victory in Occidental.
In sum, there are several viable legal theories that may be invoked to
attack actual or likely anticompetitive effects of conglomerate mergers.
Three of these theories have been accepted by the judiciary, and although
they present some evidentiary problems, those problems are far from
overwhelming. In addition, there exists the innovative but largely untested
"deep pocket" theory, which could bar many conglomerate mergers while
at the same time maintaining the traditional focus of the antitrust laws on
adverse competitive effects in specific geographic and product markets.
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the efforts of the
enforcement agencies to limit conglomerate merger activity cannot be
measured solely or even primarily by the win/loss record of the
• - 49
enforcement agencies in court. In the past, the mere threat of intervention
by the Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade Commission often has been
sufficient to stop potential mergers. Now, with the new pre-merger
notification requirements imposed under title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act,50 the agencies will have an even greater opportunity and even more
lead time to intervene in merger proceedings. In'addition, the antitrust
agencies will have a much improved data base for determining what
anticompetitive mergers they should oppose and what procompetitive
mergers they should not oppose. This case-by-case evaluation is a far more
discriminating mode of assessing the potentially adverse impacts of
conglomerate merger activity than is the extremely broad brush approach
created by S. 600.
V. THE ENACTMENT OF S. 600 WOULD ENTAIL
SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC RISKS
The enactment of S. 600 would likely entail substantial economic risks
that must be balanced against the social and political goals S. 600 is meant
49. Proponents of S. 600 contend that § 7 is not a viable tool to deal with conglomerate mergers
because the government in recent years has lost most of the conglomerate merger cases it has brought.
See 125 CONG. REc. 52417, S2418 (daily ed. March 8, 1979) (remarks of Senator Kennedy); S. 600
Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 61-66 (statement of John H. Shenefield). In large part, how-
ever, this failure appears to be due, not to the inherent weakness of § 7, but rather to the increasing
tendency of the lower courts to follow the Burger Courts instructions to look closely at the market
realities in each case and to demand substantial evidence ofanticompetitive effect before invalidating a
merger or acquisition. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
In contrast to the Warren Court, the Burger Court has, in general, eschewed the per se rules of
illegality that the Warren Court favored, see, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'i Bank &Trust
Co., 399 U.S. 350, 365-69 (1970); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-71 (1963), in favor of full scale evidentiary
consideration ofspecific market conditions and industry facts in considering the anticompetitive effects
of a merger or acquisition. See, e.g., United States Citizens&S. Nat'l Bank,422 U.S. 86(1975); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). Consequently, it may be true that the
Government is now finding it more difficult to obtain favorable outcomes in merger cases than it did
during the Warren Court years. But this greater evidentiary burden certainly is notsufficient reason to
enact broad, indiscriminateperse legislation against conglomerate mergers such as that embodied inS.
600.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 18A (1976).
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to achieve. For example, S. 600, if enacted, may create disincentives to
innovation and risk-taking that lie at the heart of our free enterprise
system. S. 600 sets arbitrary size limits measured by sales and assets.
Normally, it is procompetitive and in the best interests of our economy for
new firms to attempt to increase their sales and assets by making wise-
though perhaps risky-investments and by pioneering in the development
of new products and production techniques. Yet, if S. 600 is enacted, firms
will be put on notice that if they grow too much, they may exceed the
arbitrary size ceilings set forth in S. 600. S. 600 may therefore create real
disincentives for firms, both large and small, to grow as much and as
rapidly as they otherwise would have attempted to do.
Small firms, in particular, would face an uncertain future if S. 600
were enacted. One major incentive that fuels the entrepreneurial spirit and
growth of small firms is their ability to sell out at a profit to large firms once
they become successful. Often, the only ready buyer for such businesses is a
large conglomerate. If such firms perceived that their future saleability
would be foreclosed once they reached the "magic" dollar ceilings set forth
in sections 2(b) and 2(c) of S. 600, the business and investment decisions
made by those firms could be significantly less growth-oriented than they
otherwise would be. The burdensome nature and the uncertainty of the
affirmative defenses5' would likely deter the innovator from making
investment decisions far in advance in the hope that he might possibly
prevail years later if he wanted to sell out.
The enactment of S. 600 could also undermine the beneficial effects of
hostile takeovers by contributing to the entrenchment of less competent
managements. From a business perspective, takeovers are risky and
uncertain under the best of circumstances and recently proposed SEC and
Federal Reserve Board Rules would further discourage takeover activity.
52
S. 600 would bring much of the takeover activity relating to the top 500
corporations in this country to a halt by creating virtually insurmountable
barriers to acquisitions among and by these corporations. Without the
threat of outside takeovers, less competent managements will be less
concerned about corporate efficiency and profitability. Thus, the
diminution of hostile takeover activity that would inevitably result from
the enactment of S. 600 clearly entails economic and social costs to
consumers as well as to stockholders.53
51. See Part VI (B) infra.
52. See Wall Street's Rush to Beat the New Merger Rules, THE ECONOMIST, March 17, 1979, at
113.
53. The question of the social utility of hostile takeovers was thoroughly considered in
connection with the enactment of the Williams Act and the amendments to that Act. 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (e), (f) (1976). Recognizing the social utility of hostile takeovers, the Williams Act
attempts to maintain a neutrality between the bidder and the target companies. Parenthetically, it
should be noted that S. 600 would have the effect of overriding this policy decision by making it
virtually impossible for many of this country's most aggressive corporations to acquire firms that are
not effective competitors in their markets.
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Passage of S. 600 could also have adverse effects on international
trade by reducing the United States' ability to compete abroad. Large,
highly diversified organizations have the stability to withstand the ups and
downs in inherently unstable international markets and are oftentimes the
only organizations that are both willing and able to take the substantial
risks entailed in doing business abroad. Yet S. 600 would set artificial limits
on the growth of highly diversified domestic industries at the same time
that other countries, including Canada, the Common Market countries,
and Japan, are attempting to increase the ability of their induitries to
compete more effectively in the international marketplace by encouraging
the growth of mergers and cartels and by otherwise subsidizing their
domestic industries. Many view the relatively small volume of United
States exports as a significant factor in our balance of payments
difficulties. S. 600, if enacted, would likely exacerbate this problem.
S. 600 could also have an adverse impact on foreign investment in this
country-investment that has often proven very important to the
competitiveness of our domestic markets. S. 600 does not specify whether
it is also intended to apply to foreign firms. However, there appear to be
only two major options with respect to dealing with acquisitions by foreign
firms in the legislation and neither is attractive from a policy viewpoint. On
the one hand, foreign firms could be fully exempted from S. 600. However,
if this were done, foreign firms would have a decided advantage over
domestic firms in making acquisitions in this country,just as foreign banks
have had a decided advantage over domestic banks in making domestic
acquisitions because of the limitations against domestic bank acquisitions
imposed by the Glass-Steagall, McFadden, and Bank Holding Company
Acts.
Alternatively, foreign firms could be made fully subject to the S. 600
limits on corporate acquisitions. This alternative, however, aside from
engendering possible diplomatic problems, would also be likely to lead to
reduced foreign iivestment in this country. It is unlikely that foreign firms
that, even now, see themselves as inhibited by our antitrust laws from
maximizing their investments in this country, will even attempt to make
acquisitions that are within the purview of S. 600 if they know they will
have to prove in our courts that such acquisitions are procompetitive or
that they have "spun off" other business units equal in value to those
acquired.
The enactment of S. 600 could also have an adverse impact on the
finding of ready buyers for marginal enterprises. Often, the only buyer
both able and willing to buy an unprofitable company is a large
conglomerate. General Motors' recent sale of Frigidaire to White
Consolidated Industries is but one case in point. GM, which had lost
money in the appliance business, decided to get out of the business and
convert its plant to automotive production. White, already in the very
competitive appliance business, was the only capable buyer. GM argued to
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the Department of Justice that the sale of Frigidaire would enhance the
competition faced by the two largest full-line appliance companies, White
and Whirlpool. The Department ultimately decided to allow the
transaction to go through even though Frigidaire is a brand name
producer and both corporations were large. The Department noted that
"the transaction may eliminate previous competition between White and
Frigidaire but General Motors' discontinuance of production of Frigidaire
appliances and the absence of any other purchaser interested in the assets
were instrumental in the decision not to challenge the transaction. . , .
If GM had been prevented from selling Frigidaire to White merely because
of the size of the companies involved, a significant brand would have been
eliminated from the appliance business, presumably to the great benefit of
the already dominant producers. Thus, S. 600, by eliminating our largest
corporations as potential buyers, may have the effect of turning many
floundering companies, which could have been saved or reinvigorated by
the infusion of new capital and talent, into "failed" or "shut-down"
companies. Such a result simply cannot be reconciled with the
procompetitive goals of our antitrust laws and the concept of maximizing
competition upon which our economy is based.
VI. S. 600 WILL ALSO BE DIFFICULT AND
COSTLY TO ADMINISTER
A. Definitional Problems
The enactment of S. 600 would have the effect of vastly increasing the
complexity of administering the antitrust laws. S. 600 creates three
categories of mergers, all of which are subject to different legal standards.
Into which category a given acquisition will fall depends entirely upon the
size of the "sales" or "assets" of the acquired and the acquiring companies.
"Assets" and "sales," however, are not self-defining concepts, and S. 600
provides no definition of these critical terms.
Several examples of this definitional problem may be noted. For
example, S. 600 does not indicate how a firm's assets are to be valued,
although there are a number of alternatives that could produce widely
varying results, including present value, original cost, or original cost less
depreciation. Nor does S. 600 indicate how to treat assets held under a
variety of legal arrangements, including long-term lease arrange-
ments, sale-and-leaseback arrangements, lease-with-purchase-option
arrangements, and so forth. Even more importantly, S. 600 does not
indicate whether a firm's assets or sales are to be measured on a net or on a
gross basis; whether a firm's assets or sales are to include the assets or sales
of its subsidiaries; or whether a firm's assets or sales are to be measured on
the basis of a firm's total assets or sales, including any foreign-based assets
54. Department of Justice Press Release (April 5, 1979).
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or sales. If the assets of subsidiaries are to be included, there may be
additional definitional problems depending on whether a subsidiary is
wholly or partially owned. The problem of foreign-based assets or sales is
particularly complex, for if foreign assets or sales are to be included in
computing the dollar ceilings contained in section 2 of S. 600, how can such
assets or sales be valued in view of constantly fluctuating currency
exchange rates?
Furthermore, the dollar ceilings established by S. 600 may affect
different industries in markedly different ways, for the same dollar sums
may mean very different things to different industries. For example, $350
million in assets held by a bank may differ radically in terms of competitive
analysis from $350 million in assets held by a manufacturing firm, and $350
million in sales for a grocery store chain and $350 million in sales for an
aerospace firm may be a least as different competitively. Yet all these
entities are treated the same way under S. 600. In short, the dollar cut-offs
established in S. 600 are too crude and arbitrary to be meaningful.
B. Problems With the Affirmative Defenses
Section 3 of S. 600 establishes three affirmative defenses that can-at
least theoretically-be utilized by firms whose contemplated acquisitions
fall within sections 2(b) and 2(c) of S. 600. The first of these defenses would
allow a merger to go forward if the parties can prove that "the transaction
will have the preponderant effect of substantially enhancing competition";
the second would do the same if the parties could prove that "the
transaction will result in substantial efficiencies." The third would allow
the merger to go forward if the acquiring party "spins off" assets equal
to or greater than those of the acquired party.
The first two of these defenses (the burden shifting approach) would
likely lead to complex, costly, and unworkable litigation as Chairman
Pertschuk has predicted.55 Implementation of the shifting burden of proof
approach would create uncertainties in both the business world and in the
courts for some time to come. Mergers entail long-term structural changes,
and the current law, with its antimerger tilt, already requires the courts to
determine whether a contemplated merger "may" in the future have the
effect of creating a monopoly or lessening competition. S. 600, however,
requires the acquiring firm to meet the almost impossible burden of
proving that a given transaction will substantially enhance competition or
will result in substantial economic efficiencies. How does one prove, for
example, that one manager is better than another, and further, that a
contemplated change of management effected through a merger will
"substantially enhance competition"? How does one prove that increased
economies of scale or increased specialization will result from a given
55. S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 16 (remarks of Mr. Pertschuk); the Antitrust
Division, however, favors the burden shifting approach. Id. at 70 (remarks of Mr. Shenciild).
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transaction, and further, that such changes will "substantially enhance
competition"?
An equally problematic issue is that presented by the "preponderant
effect" burden of proof standard imposed under section 3(a)(1) of S. 600,
What exactly does this standard require? If a merger can be shown to have
created 1,000 new jobs, is this sufficient to meet the "preponderant effect of
enhancing competition" standard? Probably not, since the creation of
jobs, while socially and economically desirable, would probably not have
the "preponderant effect" of enhancing competition. Or what if a merger
that affected a total of twenty relevant markets would have a
procompetitive effect with respect to three of the markets and a neutral
effect on the remaining markets? Would this merger be found to have the
"preponderant effect" of enhancing competition and thus pass muster
under S. 600? What if it were three out of thirteen markets? Or three out of
seven markets? Unfortunately, S. 600 provides no useful guidance
whatsoever to the courts on these critical questions.
In short, the burden shifting, "regulatory" approach embodied in S.
600 is both complex and uncertain. Excessive government regulation, in
part because of the uncertainties generated by such regulation, has quite
rightfully been charged with having undermined productivity and
innovation in the private sector. Similarly, the "affirmative defenses"
contained in S. 600 are so uncertain in terms of both meaning and potential
effect that the proposed legislation could have the untoward effect of
deterring most firms from attempting to effect mergers which could fall
within one of the affirmative defense categories even though many such
mergers would prove beneficial from both an economic and a social point
of view.
The third affirmative defense also presents problems. Mr. Michael
Pertschuk, Chairman of the FC, favors the "forced divestiture" or "cap
and spin-off' approach, which is incorporated as the third affirmative
defense in section 3(a)(3) of S. 600. This approach would appear to be
somewhat less cumbersome to administer than the burden-shifting
approach would be, but it, too, is complex. The experience of the Supreme
Court in overseeing the "divestiture without delay" in El Paso56 provides
an extreme example of how complicated and time consuming it is for the
courts to supervise divestitures under our present antitrust laws. Even in
the normal case, it is seldom easy because of the difficulties in finding a
suitable buyer for the stock or assets to be divested and the problems
inherent in unscrambling commingled assets. Indeed, the difficulty in
locating a viable purchaser for a business unit for which divestiture has
56. Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 358 F. Supp,
820 (D. Colo. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973); United States v. El PasoNatural Gas Co., 291 F.
Supp. 3 (D. Utah 1968); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co,, [ 1972] Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,975
(D. Colo. July 26, 1971).
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been ordered often proves so great that the government agrees to a sale
that itself might well have been challenged as anticompetitive if
undertaken by the purchaser in the first instance.
57
Section 3(a)(3) of S. 600 would entail many of the same practical
problems that have already been experienced in administering the
divestiture remedy under our current antitrust laws. But it would be
worse-especially when a marginal competitor is involved-because not
only would a buyer have to be found, but any large buyer would have to be
prepared to spin off even less desirable assets in order to make the
purchase.
The problems do not end there, however, for section 3(a)(3) of S. 600
also raises many new and complex valuation questions that the courts
fortunately do not have to address in current antitrust divestitures. As
previously suggested, "assets" and "revenues" are not self-defining terms,
and differing accounting conventions and procedures followed by different
firms may themselves provide wildly different estimates of asset values.
What about the firm that tried for a year to sell without success a $100
million book value plant and then shut it down and sold it for scrap?
Would that count as divestiture, let alone a $100 million divestiture? Avery
complex divestiture could become the functional equivalent of a utility
commission rate case with testimony and countertestimony over the value
of the "rate base".58 Would depreciation be taken into account in
measuring assets? Or destruction by weather or war? Would obsolescent
assets be measured in terms of their book value or the cost of replacing
them by new and more efficient technology? There has been extensive
utility litigation on all these subjects, but even these utility decisions
provide no clear coherence or guidance if Congress wanted to try to use
them to find a way out of this "regulatory bog."
These valuation problems are even further magnified if foreign firms
or the foreign assets of domestic firms, or both, are taken into
consideration. For example, could a domestic corporation attempt to
defend a domestic acquisition falling within the purview of S. 600 by
contending that it had within the past year divested a business unit located
abroad which had "assets" "equal to" those of the newly acquired unit? If
so, how would such foreign assets be valued by the court, given fluctuating
currency exchange rates (not to mention the fact that the assets on the
books of the divested unit could have been valued using much different
accounting principles than were the assets on the books of the newly
57. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRusT, 673-74 (1977). Forexample, in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the government allowed the Kinney retail stores to be
purchased by F. W. Woolworth. In Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962), the government allowed the stock and assets of St. Helen's Pulp & Paper
Co. to besold to another paper producer. In United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964),
the government allowed the Hazel Atlas glass-container producing plants to be sold to Brockway
Glass, a competitor of Hazel Atlas.
58. See generally, 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMIcs OF REGULATION 35-41, 103-22 (1970).
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acquired unit)? Even for financial experts, such problems are complex; for
judges not schooled in the intricacies of corporate finance and accounting,
the difficulties in trying cases under S. 600-especially in view of the lack of
guidance contained in the proposed legislation-could prove overwhelm-
ing.
Even more importantly, the "forced divestiture" option could
undermine the very social goals S. 600 is meant to achieve. Although
section 3(a)(3) of S. 600 allows divestiture of only "viable" business units, a
firm that wished to acquire additional assets would normally spin off its
least viable business units to meet the section 3(a)(3) requirement. Such
business units often may not be able to survive on their own. If so, the
employees of the divested unit would lose their jobs. At the very least,
section 3(a)(3) would encourage perpetual and often irrational "spin-off"
activity, which, in and of itself, could lead to substantial economic and
social disruptions in those communities in which the "spun-off" firms are
located. In short, if one is concerned about the purported adverse social
effects of large conglomerates, it also seems reasonable to ask whether the
"forced divestiture" option would not actually increase the likelihood of
economic and social disruptions and lead to lesser rather than greaterjob
stability and economic opportunities for those employees who could be
affected by the spin-off activity generated by section 3(a)(3) of S. 600.
VII. CONCLUSION
S. 600 should not be enacted. It is not "antitrust" legislation. It is
populist "regulatory" legislation based on ill-defined goals that give
inadequate weight to the true costs likely to be incurred if the legislation
were enacted.
The supporters of S. 600 should ask themselves whether their
proposed legislation can meet the test for "government regulatory"
legislation laid down in chapter 9 of the recent report of the National
Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures." That test
provides a particularly valid standard because some of the most prominent
sponsors and supporters of S. 600-including Senator Kennedy, Senator
Metzenbaum, Chairman Pertschuk, and Assistant Attorney General
Shenefield-themselves signed that report. The National Commission
unanimously recommended:
1. Free market competition, protected by the antitrust laws, should
continue to be the general organizing principle for our economy.
2. Exceptions from this general principle should only be made where
there is compelling evidence of the unworkability of competition or a clearly
paramount social purpose.
3. Where such an exception is required, the least anti-competitive
method of achieving the regulatory objective should be employed. 6
59. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TIlE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 177 (January 22, 1979).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
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As far as S. 600 is concerned, there is no showing of "the
unworkability of competition," at least no showing based on the records
established in the hearing thus far. The most that can be gleaned from the
hearings to date is that the supporters tend to feel some sort of generalized
fear about the economy becoming concentrated in very few hands as a
result of recent merger activities.
One can sympathize with government enforcers who find that
conglomerate merger cases under section 7 often are not easy to win.
While the government has lost some conglomerate cases that it ought to
have won, 61 it also has won some cases that it ought to have lost. These
are simply the hazards of litigation. Yet, despite some surprises and
disappointments, the government has generally done well in the
conglomerate area under section 7. To argue that section 7 is "ineffective"
in the conglomerate area is to lose sight of what section 7 is intended to do.
It is not a "stop big mergers" statute; it is a "stop incipient losses of
competition" statute. It is directed to consumer welfare, not business
protection.
To displace a generally effective "consumer welfare" statute with a
"business protection" statute would be unwise. The fact that the latter is
unfocused in purpose, protectionist in effect, and difficult to administer
makes it even worse.
In short, this is a time for care, not emotion. Then Assistant Attorney
General Shenefield's recent remarks about the risks facing "all once and
future social engineers ''63 is correct:
[T]he bottom line lesson of regulation is that we should be exceedingly careful
before leaping forward with new and innovative regulatory solutions,
especially those that too easily discard the benefits of an efficiently
functioning marketplace. The best ideas today may prove inadequate or
debilitating in much less than a single generation.(
As Commissioner Pitofsky has warned, "[m]uch harm could be done to the
competitive process and the economy by a misguided, overenthusiastic
and insufficiently discriminating conglomerate merger policy."6 5 Unfor-
tunately, S. 600 embodies just such a policy.
61. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'1 Bancorporation, 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 410 U.S. 577 (1973), in which there were by law few other qualified
potential entrants.
62. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F. 2d 67 (10th Cir.), cert. denled, 416 U.S. 909
(1972), in which there were a large number of alternative potential entrants. Interestingly, the same
judge who found against the Justice Department in First Nat'l Bancorporation was elevated to the
Tenth Circuit when he sustained the FrC's findings in Kennecott.
63. J. Shenefield, The Deregulation of Government Enterprise-The Next Frontier for
Regulatory Reform, NEw YORK, April 12, 1979, at 1.
64. Id. at 17.
65. See Pitofsky, supra note 16, at 8.
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